DEPLOYMENT OPERATION ODIN'S FURY

FROM: vJFACC
TO: v303 FG
SUBJECT: Air Tasking Order (ATO); ATO-OOF-15526
EFFECTIVE DATES: 0001Z01JUN26

REFERENCES ​

• v303 FG MANUAL 303-1, v303 FG Policy, Procedures, & Basic Operation Standards
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS A-10C, DCS A-10C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS C-130J, DCS C-130J Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS F-16C, DCS F-16C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• Operation Odin’s Fury (OOF):
  
  • In-Flight Guide
  • Special Instructions (SPINS) & Rules of Engagement (ROE)
  • Mission DB/SIPRNET
  • Logistics Tracker
  • Theater Map
  • Target Folder

SITUATION​

The operational area remains heavily contested by aggressive Red Air and mobile Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems. The unannounced appearance of SA-22 Pantsir systems significantly altered the threat picture and effectively took over the engagement area, defeating munitions and complicating initial strike plans. Consequently, the group suffered attrition, with multiple F-16s destroyed after pilots pushed into target areas under the false assumption that SA-2 systems were suppressed without utilizing targeting pods to confirm the destruction. Friendly assets also suffered losses from hostile MiG-31, MiG-29, and Su-30 intercepts. To adapt, SEAD elements countered these advanced SHORAD capabilities by adopting close-range, low-altitude (LATN) pop-up AGM-88 HARM attacks. Flight packages also successfully employed coordinated diversionary GBU-39 drops to overwhelm SA-22 point defenses, allowing HARM shots to successfully impact their targets. These adapted tactics ultimately secured the destruction of the SA-22 Pantsir, SA-2 Fan Song tracking radar, and SA-2 search radar at Alakurtti Airfield. With the primary SAM threats degraded, F-16 strike packages successfully decimated remaining Russian armor, artillery, and infantry staging at Sodankyla.

Furthermore, A-10C flights eliminated multiple enemy convoys and local SHORAD systems, including an SA-8 and SA-9, near the Russian border checkpoint. During these close air support engagements, the A-10Cs also successfully destroyed an attacking KA-50 helicopter. Both locations were successful in pushing back Russian ground forces and maintaining NATO control of the area.

Intelligence agencies have observed Tu-95 Bear bombers at Olenya AB being armed with long range cruise missiles, Mi-8 aircraft flying logistical support to forces along the red FLOT from Ivalo, and movement across the region of Geran-2 one way attack drone assets.

SUPPORT ASSETS​

AWACS

E-3 / FOCUS / -- / 350.025 / -- / FL250 (Northern Finland)​

E-7 / WIZARD / -- / 350.0 / -- / FL350 (Southern Finland)​

TANKER

KC-135 / TEXACO / RAGNAR / 295.4 / 31Y​

KC-135 / ARCO / LAGERTHA / 225.45 / 34X​

ISR

RQ-4 / SCORE / South of FLOT / 246.0 / -- / FL600​

MQ-9 / COLT / BALDR / 247.0 / -- FL290​

​

WEATHER CONDITIONS​

• 1020L AUTO 09006KT 9999 BRKN013 OVC022 07/07 A2987

MISSION​

• Thursday, 4 June 2026 // MSN NUMBER [SQDRN]15526 v303 EFG units primary focus for this week is to engage and attempt to destroy/push back Russian forces along the red FLOT and CAP /Intercept operations along the eastern FLOT to counter any Tu-95 strikes.
• Top 5 target priorities have been updated for the week, reference the target folder for more details.

​

• Reminder for flight leads to include in the AAR if they land at a location other than their original launch locations if not specifically assigned below.
  
  • v93 FS will launch out of Rovaniemi AB (EFRO) tasked with CAP/Intercept Tu-95 bombers and AI along the red FLOT. Landing location is at leads discretion
    
    • CAP/Intercept; Western anchor point N67°07.778' E028°08.046', Eastern anchor point N66°49.742' E029°48.795'
    • AI; 61st NIB along FLOT at N67° 48.126' E024° 47.815' (Priority 1)
    • AI; 71st GMRD along the FLOT at Savukoski (N67° 17.500' E028° 09.866') (Priority 2)
  • v303 FS will launch from FOB Hosio tasked with AI along the red FLOT and engage 61st NIB and 44th AC. V303 FS aicraft will land at FOB Vuojarvi (35W MQ 80062 39222) after their sortie.
    
    • 61st NIB along the FLOT at 35W MR 52121 07110 (Priority 3)
    • 44th AC along the FLOT at 35W MR 89624 06868 (Priority 4)
  • v757 AS tasked with to logistical support to Rovaniemi, FOB Hosio, FOB Voujarvi, and other FOBs/airfields in Finland.
    
    • FOB Voujarvi has critical needs for the following:
      
      • GBU-54, GBU-12, CBU-105s, AGM-65 (D & L)
      • AIM-9
      • ALQ-184 Long, AN/AAAQ-28s
• See Attachment 1 for FRAGO.
• For sorties outside of Thursday 4 June should review the Target Folder selecting a task that has not been assigned yet or plan for a target that has an Reattack Recommendation (RR) of “Reattack Recommended.”

///SIGNED///
SNOOPY
Command Staff, v303rd Fighter Group

ATTACHMENT 1 / 15526 FRAGO​

MSN NUMBER: 93FS15526
TASKUNIT/V93 FS/ROVANIEMI AB//
MSNDAT/93FS15526A/CAP/F-16C/--/--/--//
TGTINFO/CAP ANCHOR WEST/COORD:N6707.778 E02808.046//
TGTINFO/CAP ANCHOR EAST/COORD:N6649.742 E02948.795//
AMPN/INTERCEPT TU-95 BOMBERS//
MSNDAT/93FS15526B/AI/F-16C/--/--/--//
TGTINFO/61ST NIB FLOT/COORD:N6748.126 E02447.815//
MSNDAT/93FS15526C/AI/F-16C/--/--/--//
TGTINFO/71ST GMRD SAVUKOSKI/COORD:N6717.500 E02809.866//
AMPN/LANDING AT LEAD DISCRETION//

MSN NUMBER: 303FS15526
TASKUNIT/V303 FS/FOB HOSIO//
MSNDAT/303FS15526A/AI/A-10C/--/--/--//
TGTINFO/61ST NIB FLOT/MGRS:35WMR5212107110//
MSNDAT/303FS15526B/AI/A-10C/--/--/--//
TGTINFO/44TH AC FLOT/MGRS:35WMR8962406868//
AMPN/LOADOUT REQ: 2X CBU-105, 2X GBU-12, 2X AIM-9, AN/AAQ-28 LITENING, ALQ-184 LONG, 1130 CM//
AMPN/MANDATORY RECOVERY TO FOB VUOJARVI AT MGRS 35WMQ8006239222//

MSN NUMBER: 757AS15526
TASKUNIT/V757 AS/THEATER//
MSNDAT/15526D/LOG/C-130J/--/--/--//
AMPN/LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ROVANIEMI, FOB HOSIO, FOB VUOJARVI//
AMPN/CRITICAL VUOJARVI RESUPPLY: GBU-54, GBU-12, CBU-105, AGM-65D, AGM-65L, AIM-9, ALQ-184 LONG, AN/AAQ-28//

OPERATION ODIN’S FURY: TACTICAL AIR EXECUTION PLAN ATO-OOF-14826​

References:

• AFDP 5-0 (Planning)
• OPORD Amend. 01
• CAOC Directives; SPINS/ROE 11326

1. SITUATION & MISSION ANALYSIS​

Enemy forces have established reinforced positions, forward staging areas, and integrated air defense systems (IADS) threatening friendly Finnish forces and allied airspace. Our objective is to dismantle the enemy air defense umbrella, degrade their rotary-wing attack capabilities, interdict advancing mechanized columns, and provide Close Air Support (CAS) to allied border guards.

Target Sets:

• Target Area Alpha (93FS14826A/B): Forward airbase containing a complete SA-2 "Guideline" SAM battery (Fan Song TRN, Flat Face SR, 5x Launchers) and parked attack/transport helicopters (Ka-50s, Mi-24s, Mi-8s).
• Target Area Charlie (303FS14826A): 44th Army Corps (AC) reinforced positions and convoy, protected by an SA-15 "Gauntlet" (Tor) mobile SAM system. Enemy is utilizing burn pits for IR masking.
• Target Area Bravo (303FS14826B): Finnish Jaeger Brigade and Border Guard positions facing imminent threat from anticipated Red Force mechanized entry points via a constricted forest road.

2. COMMANDER'S INTENT (Based on OPORD / CAOC)​

• Purpose: Neutralize Red Force offensive capabilities in the sector and protect Finnish territorial integrity.
• Method: Execute a coordinated two-pronged strike. The v93rd FS (F-16C) will conduct Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) and destruction of staged logistics. The v303 FS (A-10C) will execute CAS and Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI).
• Endstate: SA-2 and SA-15 sites destroyed, Russian forces convoys halted, recapture border checkpoint, and destruction of staged vehicles & logistical support.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS)

SEAD / DEAD & Airfield Strike (v93rd FS 'Makos' - F-16C)​

Tasking: MSN# 93FS14826A/B

• Target Priority: 1. S-75 "Fan Song" TRN (N66°58.588' E030°22.803') & Flat Face SR.
  
  • SA-2 Launchers (Guideline LN x5).
  • Ka-50, Mi-24, and Mi-8 parking areas.
• Execution Summary: The SA-2 presents a high-altitude threat to both F-16s and A-10s. The 'Makos' will push first. A primary SEAD flight will ingress low to utilize terrain masking, popping up to employ AGM-88 HARMs against the Fan Song and Flat Face radars. Once the SA-2 is blind, follow-on strike elements will drop CBU-97/105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons or GBU-31/38 JDAMs on the static launcher sites and the rotary-wing staging areas to prevent airborne interception by the Ka-50s.
• SPINS/ROE Consideration: Confirm target coordinates precisely; avoid collateral damage to non-combatant infrastructure near the airfield.

Close Air Support (v303 FS - A-10C)​

Tasking: MSN# 303FS14826A

• Target Priority: Red Force armor/infantry advancing on the Finnish Jaeger Brigade (N 66°58.771' E030°20.172').
• Execution Summary: Troops in Contact (TIC) scenario. Strict adherence to ROE 11326 is required to prevent fratricide of the Finnish Border Guard reinforcements. A-10s will hold at an Initial Point (IP) outside the threat ring. Attacks will be heavily coordinated with a ground JTAC or AFAC. Because the enemy entry point is a constrained forest road, A-10s should aim to disable the lead and trail vehicles of the Red Force advance using precise weapons (GBU-12/38 or AGM-65), creating a roadblock. Follow up with 30mm GAU-8 runs along the road axis.

Battlefield Air Interdiction (v303 FS - A-10C)​

Tasking: MSN# 303FS14826B

• Target Priority: 1. SA-15 Tor "Gauntlet" (35W NQ 88258 26369)
• 44th AC Convoy (35W NQ 87691 26240) & 44th AC Reinforced Positions (35W NQ 87984 26282)
• Execution Summary: The SA-15 is a lethal threat to the slow-moving A-10C. CRITICAL: A-10s must not enter the WEZ (Weapon Engagement Zone) of the SA-15 until it is destroyed. A-10s will employ standoff weapons (AGM-65D/G Maverick) from maximum range or request a joint-strike assist from the F-16s to neutralize the Tor. Intelligence Note: The enemy is using "burn pits" to mask thermal signatures. A-10 pilots must be briefed that their Targeting Pods (TGP) in FLIR mode may be degraded or cluttered by these heat sources. Crews should cross-reference CCD (TV) mode and utilize Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) radar feeds (if supported by AWACS/JSTARS) to differentiate the 44th AC from the burn pits. Once the Tor is neutralized, execute standard high-angle strafe and GBU/CBU attacks on the convoy and reinforced positions.

4. RECOMMENDED LOADOUTS​

• F-16C (v93rd FS - 93FS14826A/B): 2x AGM-88 HARM, 2x CBU-105 WCMD (or 4x GBU-38), 2x AIM-120C, 2x AIM-9X, HTS Pod, TGP, ALQ-184 ECM pod.
• A-10C (v303 FS - 303FS14826A): 2x AGM-65L, 4x GBU-54 JDAM, APKWS / rockets, Litening TGP, AIM-9M, ALQ-184 Long. (Loadout biased towards precision to avoid friendly fire).
• A-10C (v303 FS - 303FS14826B): 2x AGM-65D Maverick (for SA-15 standoff), 2x CBU-97, 2x GBU-54, Litening TGP, AIM-9M, ALQ-184 Long.

FROM: vJFACC
TO: v303 FG
SUBJECT: Air Tasking Order (ATO); ATO-OOF-14826
EFFECTIVE DATES: 0001Z28MAY26

REFERENCES​

• v303 FG MANUAL 303-1, v303 FG Policy, Procedures, & Basic Operation Standards
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS A-10C, DCS A-10C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS C-130J, DCS C-130J Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS F-16C, DCS F-16C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• Operation Odin’s Fury (OOF):
  
  • In-Flight Guide
  • Special Instructions (SPINS) & Rules of Engagement (ROE)
  • Mission DB/SIPRNET
  • Logistics Tracker
  • Theater Map
  • Target Folder

SITUATION​

After a pause in operations due to weather (mission performance/new server set-up) v303 FG operations resumed on 21 May 2026. During a routine RECCE tasking for both the v93 FS and v303 FS Rovaniemi came under attack from Russian one way attack drones. Luckily all aircraft were able to launch without issue and the airfield did not sustain any damage to the runway. Receiving updated taskings after launch; the v303 FS crossed into Russian airspace to target the origins of the OWA drone threat successfully located and completely neutralized 7 out of 8 Russian drone launchers inside the Russian federation while the v93 FS assisted by SAM batteries at Rovaniemi AB, successfully destroyed Russian Tu-22 bombers enroute to Rovaniemi. The successful engagement ensured Rovaniemi only had damage from the OWA drones but the runway remains undamaged and available for use.

Russian forces have breached the eastern border and advanced into Finnish territory. The Russian forward line of troops (FLOT) has consolidated at the cities of Sirkka, Sodankylä, and Savukoski, as well as along the Finnish border tracking Route 82. Furthermore, Russian military elements have seized and occupied Ivalo, transforming the site into a forward operating base for Mi-24 Hind rotary attack assets and Su-33 Flanker-D fixed-wing fighters.

In response to these unprovoked attacks, Finland has formally invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO Allies are united, actively mobilizing collective defense operations. The v303 Fighter Group (v303 FG) has shifted from a deterrence posture to active combat and territorial defense operations.

​

SUPPORT ASSETS​

AWACS

E-3 / FOCUS / -- / 350.025 / -- / FL250 (Northern Finland)​

E-7 / WIZARD / -- / 350.0 / -- / FL350 (Southern Finland)​

TANKER

KC-135 / TEXACO / RAGNAR / 295.4 / 31Y​

KC-135 / ARCO / LAGERTHA / 225.45 / 34X​

ISR

RQ-4 / SCORE / South of FLOT / 246.0 / -- / FL600​

MQ-9 / COLT / BALDR / 247.0 / -- FL290​

WEATHER CONDITIONS​

• Forecast: Details to be provided Morning of 26 May 2026
  • Rovaniemi:
  • Hosio:

MISSION​

Thursday, 21 May 2026 // MSN NUMBER [SQDRN]14826 v303 EFG units have transitioned to kinetic operations against Russian Forces, the v93 FS continues to operate out of Rovaniemi AB while v303 FS has began executing ACE operations in theater currently located at FOB Hosio (road runway).

Top 5 target priorities have been updated for the week, reference the target folder for more details.

Mission planners can expect satellite and ISR imagery of their taskings the morning of 26 May 2026.

WARNING​

v303 FG members are reminded that OOF is a near pear conflict and bases can (and likely will) be attacked at any time. Members need to expedite ground operations and get airborne as quickly as possible. If a flight member has a redball it is suggested from Command for the good aircraft get airborne and remain in the area waiting for the aircraft working a redball.

• v93 FS tasked with DEAD on SA-2 site and strike on logistic staging area at Alakurtti AB.
  
  • SA-2 at N66°58.56194' E030°22.74933'
  • Alakurtti AB logistics staging area at N66°58.30227' E030°20.41280'
• v303 FS tasked with CAS at the boarder crossing in BALDR AO supporting Finish ground forces & AI at the Northern Frigg AO boarder crossing which is currently occupied by the Russian army 44th AC.
  
  • CAS Baldr Border checkpoint 36W UU 67720 00525
  • AI at Frigg Border checkpoint 35W NQ 87996 26276
• v757 AS tasked with to logistical support to Rovaniemi, Hosio, other FOBs/airfields in Finland.
  
  • Hosio has critical needs for the following:
    
    • GBU-54, GBU-12, AGM-65 (D and L)
    • AIM-9
    • ALQ-184 Long, AN/AAAQ-28s
    • See Attachment 1 for FRAGO.

///SIGNED///
SNOOPY
Command Staff, v303rd Fighter Group

ATTACHMENT 1 / FRAGO​

MSN NUMBER: 93FS14826A
TASKUNIT/v93 FS/ICAO:EFRO//
MSNDAT/-/-/DEAD/DEPLOC: EFRO/ARRLOC: EFRO//
MSNACFT/-/ACTYP:F16C/-//
TGT: SA2/TGTLOC: N66°58.56194' E030°22.74933'/NET:-/NLT:-/TGT:-//
CONTROL/PFREQ: VALHALLA 303.025/SFREQ:350.025/NAME: FOCUS//

MSN NUMBER: 93FS14826B
TASKUNIT/v93 FS/ICAO:EFRO//
MSNDAT/-/-/DEAD/DEPLOC: EFRO/ARRLOC: EFRO//
MSNACFT/-/ACTYP:F16C/-//
TGT: ALAKURTTI AB STAGING AREA /TGTLOC: N66°58.30227' E030°20.41280'/NET:-/NLT:-/TGT:-//
CONTROL/PFREQ: VALHALLA 303.025/SFREQ:350.025/NAME: FOCUS//

MSN NUMBER: 303FS14826A
TASKUNIT/v303 FS/ICAO: HOSIO//
MSNDAT/-/-/CAS/DEPLOC: HOSIO /ARRLOC: HOSIO//
MSNACFT/-/ ACTYP:A10C/-//
TGTLOC/36W UU 67720 00525/NET:-/NLT:-/TGT:-//
CONTROL/PFREQ: VALHALLA 303.025/SFREQ:350.0/NAME: WIZARD//
JTAC/-//

MSN NUMBER: 303FS14826b
TASKUNIT/v303 FS/ICAO: HOSIO//
MSNDAT/-/-/AI/DEPLOC: HOSIO /ARRLOC: HOSIO//
MSNACFT/-/ ACTYP:A10C/-//
TGTLOC/ 35 W NQ 88277 26310/NET:-/NLT:-/TGT:-//
CONTROL/PFREQ: VALHALLA 303.025/SFREQ: 350.025/NAME: FOCUS//

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 12826​

TO: Combat Command / G2 Intelligence Cell
FROM: Intel Officer, USAF
DATE: 24 MAY 2026
SUBJECT: Kola/Karelia Front Enemy Air Defense and Mobilization Buildup

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Recent satellite imagery analysis confirms a significant buildup of adversary air defense and logistical assets in the area of operations (vicinity N67° E030°). The adversary is actively establishing an integrated air defense system (IADS) overlaying a major railhead and vehicle staging area. This posturing indicates active staging for offensive operations. In alignment with our primary goal to act as a deterrence to aggression or mobilization, immediate strikes are required to dismantle this buildup, neutralize the air defense umbrella, and cripple the rail logistics node.

2. TARGET AREA ANALYSIS & SQUADRON TASKING

A. SEAD / DEAD Operations (v93 FS "Makos")
The adversary has established long-range early warning and medium-to-high altitude area defense to protect the staging sector. The F-16Cs of the 93rd FS are tasked with dismantling these primary sensor and engagement nodes to open the corridor for follow-on close air support and interdiction packages.

• Target 93FS14426A (SA-2 "Guideline" Site): A fully operational SA-2 surface-to-air missile battery has been identified. Key vulnerabilities are the FAN SONG engagement radar (N67°35.975' E030°29.633') and the P19 "Flat Face" search radar (N67°35.942' E030°29.601'). Six launchers are confirmed in revetments.

• Target 93FS14426B (IL119 Site): An early warning/communications node (IL119) is positioned nearby at N67° 36.114' E030° 29.214' (MGRS 36 W UA 93162 00648). Destruction of this asset will severely degrade the adversary's regional airspace picture and command-and-control capabilities.

B. Strike / Interdiction Operations (v303 FS "KC Hawgs")
Beneath the primary IADS umbrella, a significant tactical buildup is underway at a local rail yard. The A-10Cs of the 303rd FS are tasked with prosecuting the tactical SAM threat covering the railhead, followed by a systematic destruction of the staged mobilization assets.

• Target 303FS14426A (SA-11 Buk "Gadfly" Site): A mobile SA-11 tactical SAM battery is providing point defense over the rail yard. Imagery confirms the presence of a Snow Drift Search Radar, a central C2 node, and at least two Fire Dome Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs).

• Target 303FS14426B (Mobilization Node / Railhead): Once the SA-11 threat is neutralized, the primary interdiction tasking begins. Imagery confirms a heavy mobilization presence:
  
  • Staged Vehicles: A mechanized vehicle staging area is confirmed at DMPI 36 W VT 13442 94890.
  • Rail Logistics: Three distinct, loaded trains are holding in the yard (North Train, North East Train, and South West Train). Striking these rolling logistical assets is critical to halting the enemy's mobilization momentum.

3. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The coordination between the strategic SA-2 site and the tactical SA-11 site indicates a deliberate effort to protect the railhead during a critical vulnerability window (offloading/staging). The v93 FS must successfully suppress or destroy the SA-2 and EWR sites to allow the v303 FS to operate in the medium-altitude block required to identify and prosecute the SA-11 and subsequent ground targets. Disruption of this rail node directly serves our operational mandate by demonstrating the capability and will to halt adversary mobilization in the region.

OPERATION ODIN’S FURY – F-16C SUPPLEMENTAL TARGETING BRIEF
Unit: v93 FS / F-16C Makos
Subject: Priority SEAD Tasking – Central Kola Belt
Planning Focus: Rapid SEAD execution against newly surfaced SAM/EWR threats in support of Sunday’s MSN.

---

Makos,

We have two supplemental targets pulled from the Target Folder for this Sunday’s mission planning cycle. Both targets sit inside the Central Kola Belt, and both directly affect package survivability, freedom of maneuver, and our ability to open the lane for follow-on strike or CAS assets.

The threat picture is straightforward: an SA-2 site and a 1L119 EWR have been identified as priority SEAD targets. The SA-2 presents a direct surface-to-air threat, while the 1L119 provides early warning coverage that can cue additional enemy IADS responses and complicate our ingress/egress.

---

COURSE OF ACTION – SEAD TARGET 1​

MSN Target: Pick 1
Assigned Unit: v93 FS / F-16C
Target: SA-2
Category: SAM
ALR: EXTREME ALR
Score: 296
Region: CENTRAL KOLA BELT
MGRS: 36 W UA 93423 00318
LAT/LON: N67° 35.9425' E030° 29.6004'
Status: Tasked
Why: Assigned priority SEAD target

Tactical Considerations​

The SA-2 remains the primary immediate threat due to its ability to deny medium-altitude operations and force packages into predictable terrain-masked routing. Makos should plan to prosecute this target as a priority IADS node, with emphasis on minimizing exposure time and avoiding unnecessary overflight of the engagement envelope.

The preferred gameplan is a deliberate SEAD push using HARM and/or precision follow-up effects depending on loadout availability and mission commander intent. Flights should remain disciplined on timing, sensor sorting, and deconfliction with any supporting strike assets. If the SA-2 is active, the priority is suppression first, destruction second, while maintaining aircraft survivability.

---

COURSE OF ACTION – SEAD TARGET 2​

MSN Target: Pick 2
Assigned Unit: v93 FS / F-16C
Target: 1L119
Category: EWR
ALR: HIGH ALR
Score: 253
Region: CENTRAL KOLA BELT
MGRS: 36 W UA 93162 00648
LAT/LON: N67° 36.1143' E030° 29.2136'
Status: Tasked
Why: Assigned priority EWR target

Tactical Considerations​

NOTE: EWRs sometimes will not show on HTS or HAD. Use TGP to get precise targetting. The 1L119 EWR is a key enabler for the enemy air defense network. While it may not be the shooter, it extends the enemy’s ability to detect, track, and cue fighters or SAM systems against friendly packages. Removing or suppressing this radar reduces the enemy’s early warning coverage and helps create a cleaner operating window for the rest of the force.

Recommended F-16C Employment​

Makos should consider this a high-value electronic warfare and IADS shaping target. If paired with the SA-2 tasking, the EWR should be planned as either a coordinated second kill-chain target or a rapid follow-on attack once the SA-2 is suppressed. Precision timing matters here — knocking out the EWR early can blind the enemy network before the main package commits deeper into the belt.

---

EXECUTION​

Makos need to come ready tomorrow with their game face on. These are not casual targets — the SA-2 and 1L119 EWR are both priority Central Kola threats that can affect the entire Sunday package if left untouched.

2-ship / 4-ship SEAD flow: one element sorts and suppresses the SA-2, second element either backs up the shooter or transitions to the EWR.
HARM shots with discipline: no cowboy shots unless we have the emitter sorted. Prioritize clean handoffs, brevity, and timing.
Pop-up / standoff timing: stay masked as much as practical, expose only long enough to shoot or confirm, then drag back out.

Follow-on precision option: if the HARM suppresses but doesn’t kill, be ready to push a follow-up weapon or coordinate another pass.

If msn goes to plan, flow South to assist the v303FS with their SA11 SAM TGT and/or provide BARCAP until all Hawgs are off-station.

OPERATION ODIN’S FURY - MISSION PLANNING BRIEF
Reference: Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 5-0, Planning
Subject: Strike Package Execution – Pyaozersky Rail Depot & SA-11 Site

As a key planner utilizing the Joint Planning Process (JPP) outlined in AFDP 5-0, the following concept of operations (CONOPS) has been developed for the A-10C strike package. Our primary planning constraint is the high-threat air-to-air (A/A) and surface-to-air (SAM) environment.
Mission Numbers: 303FS14426A/B

PART 1: MISSION ANALYSIS – THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Geographical Analysis (Pyaozersky Area)
Pyaozersky is located in the Republic of Karelia, Russia, near Lake Pyaozero. The geography is characterized by dense taiga forests, extensive glacial lakes, and undulating rolling hills (elevations typically ranging from 300 to 800 feet MSL).

● Tactical Advantage: The rolling terrain and deep lake valleys are highly advantageous for A-10C Nap-of-the-Earth (NOE) flying.
● Threat Environment: The SA-11 (Buk-M1) is a highly lethal medium-range SAM with a range of ~15-18 nm. It will outrange the A-10’s standoff weapons. Furthermore, Russian A-50 AWACS and Combat Air Patrols (Su-33/MiG-31) possess Look-Down/Shoot-Down radar capabilities.

Threat Mitigation Strategy (Terrain Masking & Notching):
To survive AWACS and fighter radars, the A-10Cs must remain in the "radar weed line." By flying extremely low (below 100 feet AGL) through the valleys, the aircraft will blend into the ground clutter. If painted by a MiG-31 (Zaslon phased-array radar) or Su-33, the A-10s must immediately "notch" (turn 90 degrees to the threat radar beam) while masking behind hills, dropping below the Doppler gate of the enemy radars.

PART 2: COURSE OF ACTION (COA) – SA-11 SUPPRESSION / DESTRUCTION (DEAD)
MSN#: 303FS14426A
Target: SA-11 Site (36 W VT 13559 95256)
Asset: 1x Flight of Two (2) A-10Cs (Callsign: [TBD] 1)

Attacking an active SA-11 in an A-10C is a high-risk operation because the A-10 lacks traditional SEAD tools (like HARM missiles). The key is stealth via terrain masking.

1. Tactics:

● Ingress: [TBD] 1 will ingress at ultra-low level using the valleys surrounding Lake Pyaozero. Emissions Control (EMCON) will be strict—radar altimeters only, data-link passive.
● The Pop-Up Maneuver: The flight will approach a pre-planned Initial Point (IP) behind a ridgeline approximately 5-7 nm from the SA-11 site. At the IP, both aircraft will execute a rapid pop-up maneuver, climbing just high enough to gain line-of-sight (LOS) on the SAM site.
● Execution: Using the Litening Targeting Pod (TGP) slaved to the DMPI coordinates, the pilots will rapidly acquire the SA-11 Search Radar (Snow Drift) or TELARs (Fire Dome), fire their missiles, and immediately perform a split-S or hard slice back down into the terrain to break the SA-11’s radar lock.

2. Weaponeering Suggestions:
● AGM-65D (Infrared Mavericks): Each jet should carry 4x Mavericks.
● AIM-9M Sidewinders: 2x on Station 11 for self-defense if an Su-33 drops into the valley.
● ALQ-184 Long ECM Pod: Essential for jamming if the SA-11 gets a lock during the pop-up.
● Countermeasures: Heavy Chaff loadout (for both the SA-11 and potential A/A radar missiles).

PART 3: COURSE OF ACTION (COA) – PYAOZERSKY RAIL DEPOT STRIKE
MSN#: 303FS14426B
Target: Rail Depot (36 W VT 13643 94760)
Asset: 2x Flights of Two (4) A-10Cs (Callsign: [TBD] 1 and [TBD] 2)

Once [TBD] 1 calls "Rifle" and confirms the destruction or suppression of the SA-11, the main strike package will engage the rail depot.

1. Tactics:
● Holding Pattern: While Tusk 1 engages the SAM, the 4-ship strike package will hold at a masked rally point deep in a valley, flying in a low-level circle out of LOS of enemy radar.
● Multi-Axis Attack: Upon receiving the "Target Destroyed" signal for the SA-11, [TBD] 1 and [TBD] 2 will push to the depot. To confuse surviving short-range air defenses (SHORAD/AAA) and minimize exposure to the overhead CAP, the flights will attack from two different axes (e.g., North and West) simultaneously.
● Attack Profile: The pilots will utilize a low-level pop-up attack, lofting GPS-guided munitions or releasing high-drag bombs, minimizing their time exposed above the ridgelines. Given the AWACS threat, they will not loiter. GAU-8 gun runs are heavily discouraged unless the fighter CAP has been pulled away by friendly F-15/F-16s.

2. Weaponeering Suggestions:

● CBU-97 WCMD (Sensor Fuzed Weapon): The absolute best weapon for a rail depot. Two CBU-97s dropped over the depot will release "skeets" that independently seek out the heat signatures of locomotives, armored trains, and fuel trucks, devastating a massive area in a single pass.
● Mk-82 AIR (High Drag): If GPS is jammed or weather is incredibly low, high-drag dumb bombs allow the A-10s to stay directly on the deck (sub-500 feet) and lay down a destructive spread across the rail yard without taking blast damage from their own ordnance.
● AIM-9M Sidewinders: 2x on Station 11 for self-defense if an Su-33 drops into the valley.
● ALQ-184 Long ECM Pod: Essential for jamming if the SA-11 gets a lock during the pop-up.

Summary for Execution
This plan heavily relies on disciplined NOE flying and strict timing. [TBD] 1 must surgically remove the SA-11 to open the door. The entire package must rely on the physical earth (Karelia's hills and lakes) as their primary armor against the Su-33/MiG-31 CAP and AWACS. Successful execution of this AFDP 5-0 planned COA will result in the total destruction of the depot with maximum survivability for the A-10s.

Command authorizes the use of CBU munitions due to the fact minimum civilian casualties are anticipated in the industrial area around the rail yard.

PRIVATE, V303 FG ONLY
ISSUING HEADQUARTERS: vNATO SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS (SHAPE)
EFFECTIVE DATE/TIME: 23 MAY 2026, 0001Z
OPERATION ORDER (OPORD): ODIN’S FURY (AMENDMENT 01)

1. SITUATION​

General: The Russian Federation has abandoned strategic posturing and transitioned to open, coordinated hostility against the Republic of Finland. Coordinated kinetic strikes have targeted Finnish critical infrastructure, energy grids, and communication networks.

Enemy Forces: Russian forces have breached the eastern border and advanced into Finnish territory. The Russian forward line of troops (FLOT) has consolidated at the cities of Sirkka, Sodankylä, and Savukoski, as well as along the Finnish border tracking Route 82. Furthermore, Russian military elements have seized and occupied Ivalo, transforming the site into a forward operating base for Mi-24 Hind rotary attack assets and Su-33 Flanker-D fixed-wing fighters.

Friendly Forces: In response to these unprovoked attacks, Finland has formally invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO Allies are united, actively mobilizing collective defense operations. The v303 Fighter Group (v303 FG) has shifted from a deterrence posture to active combat and territorial defense operations.

2. MISSION​

Defend the territorial integrity of Finland under Article 5 collective defense mandates. The v303 FG, in close coordination with Finnish Defense Forces, conducts offensive counter-air, infrastructure protection, and close air support operations to halt the Russian ground advance, neutralize forward-deployed enemy aviation assets, and restore the sovereign borders of Finland.

3. EXECUTION​

a. Commander’s Intent: My primary objective is Collective Defense by Denial and Defeat. The myth of a fractured NATO is shattered; we are now in an active state of theater combat. We will eliminate any hostile forces violating Finnish airspace, protect surviving civil and military infrastructure, and systematically degrade the Russian 44th Army Corps' capability to project power deeper into Lapland. Success is defined as the complete containment of the Russian ground penetration, elimination of the A2/AD bubble at Ivalo, restoration of the pre-conflict international border, and degrade Russian military forces in the Kola Peninsula to ensure an invasion is impossible in the future.

b. Concept of Operations (CONOPS): The operation has transitioned out of the original Phases I–III and enters Phase IV (Kinetic Defense and Counter-Offensive):

• Phase IV-A (Air Superiority & Strike): Establish absolute air superiority over Lapland, protect Rovaniemi AB, and neutralize Russian long-range attack drone infrastructure.
• Phase IV-B (Containment & Close Air Support): Provide devastating CAS to NATOGround Forces to halt the Russian advance along the Sirkka-Sodankylä-Savukoski-Route 82 line.
• Phase IV-C (Rollback): Isolate and neutralize the occupied airfield at Ivalo to cut off Russian Mi-24 and Su-33 forward deployments.

c. Tasks to Subordinate Units:

• 93rd FS "Makos" (F-16C): Shift from active scramble to persistent Offensive Counter-Air (OCA), Defensive Counter-Air (DCA),Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), and strike operations. Maintain the defense of Rovaniemi AB alongside local SAM assets. Actively hunting and destroying strategic bombers and Su-33 fighter assets operating from Ivalo.
• 303rd FS "KC Hawgs" (A-10C): Transition from familiarization to maximum-effort Close Air Support (CAS), interdiction, and strike operations. (Note: Initial Strike tasks successfully executed inside Russian airspace, neutralizing 7 of 8 Russian version Iranian OWA drone launchers). Re-role immediately to target Russian armored columns, mechanized units, and Mi-24 rotary positions holding the Sirkka, Sodankylä, and Savukoski perimeters.
• 757th AS "Blue Tigers" (C-130J-30): Adapt the logistical backbone to a high-threat environment. Execute emergency combat resupply and airfield optimization flights, supporting the distribution of munitions, Class III fuel, and parts to Rovaniemi AB and decentralized auxiliary fields.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

Transponder Posture: All combat assets must insure Mode # is set properly to avoid a blue on blue incident.

Rules of Engagement (ROE): Active wartime ROE are in effect. Pilots are authorized for immediate weapon engagement upon positive identification (PID) of hostile Russian forces within the Finnish Theater of Operations, per NATO Article 5 execution directives.

4. SUSTAINMENT​

Theater Status: Rovaniemi AB remains operational despite Russian strategic attempts to neutralize the field. It serves as the primary hub for v303 FG combat generation but NATO Air Forces have been ordered to execute ACE operations after their next departure from Rovaniemi AB to help survivability. Logistical support aircraft in the region must priorities airlift operations into ACE and road runways within the region to allow for quick refueling and reloading operations for combat aircraft.

Host Nation Support: Finnish Defense Forces continue to provide critical Class I and Class III support. Emergency logistical lines are being augmented by NATO Allied assets to repair and reinforce localized infrastructure damaged in the May 22 opening strikes.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL​

Unity of Command: Despite diplomatic rhetoric, all v303 assets remain under the operational control (OPCON) of vSACEUR.

Snoopy
SNOOPY
Command Staff, v303rd Fighter Group

CLASSIFIED // RELEASABLE TO NATO​

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD TO: Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) / Theater Command
FROM: G-2 Intelligence Directorate, USAF Intelligence Officer
SUBJECT: Joint Intelligence Narrative – Russian Federation Incursion & Attack Against the Republic of Finland

Executive Summary​

On 22 May 2026, the Russian Federation initiated a massive, coordinated, and multi-domain military campaign targeting the sovereign territory, military installations, and critical civilian infrastructure of the Republic of Finland. In response to the scale and severity of these deliberate strikes, the Government of Finland has formally invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO Allies are actively mobilizing collective defense measures to counter further aggression and restore territorial integrity.

1. Hostile Air Operations & Infrastructure Strikes​

The opening phase of the Russian assault sought to paralyze Finnish leadership, shatter national governance, and neutralize regional air defense capabilities through a synchronized aerial campaign.

• Rovaniemi Air Base Strategic Assault: Rovaniemi Air Base (AB) was a primary target for Russian strategic assets. Russian forces deployed long-range, one-way attack (OWA) drones (modeled after Iranian designs) alongside Tu-22 strategic bombers in a concentrated effort to neutralize the airfield.
• Defensive Interdiction: The strike on Rovaniemi AB was successfully repelled. Local Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems paired with v303 Fighter Group assets—specifically v93 Fighter Squadron "Mako" F-16s—intercepted the incoming threats, successfully downing the Tu-22 bombers and drone salvos before major infrastructure damage could be inflicted.
• National Infrastructure Impact: Beyond military sites, Russian strikes targeted energy distribution grids and communications hubs across multiple Finnish regions, causing temporary localized power and network blackouts. Finnish civil authorities and defense forces managed to maintain operational cohesion, rapidly restoring core capabilities.

2. Russian Ground Incursion & Territorial Intrusion​

Following the initial aerial bombardment, Russian ground forces initiated a swift cross-border offensive into northern Finland, cutting deeply into Finnish territory before stabilizing into an established forward line of troops (FLOT).

• Northern Penetration Vector: Russian mechanized elements breached the eastern border, securing the municipality of Ivalo. In a significant forward projection of power, the Russian military has occupied and converted local infrastructure to support forward-deployed rotary and naval aviation assets, specifically Mi-24 Hind assault helicopters and Su-33 Flanker-D fighters.
• The Forward Line of Troops (FLOT): The Russian ground advance has currently consolidated along a broad front in Lapland, holding forward positions at the following key perimeters:
• Sirkka (Northwest sector)
• Sodankylä (Central-North sector)
• Savukoski (Central-East sector)
• The Finnish border corridor tracking along Route 82 (Southern-East sector)

3. Allied Counter-Operations & Kinetic Response​

Under the pre-planned collective defense framework mobilized by the Theater Security Package (TSP), NATO and USAF assets immediately engaged in offensive counter-air and infrastructure protection missions.

• Strike Operations: In a devastating counter-strike, v303 FG A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft crossed into Russian airspace to target the origins of the OWA drone threat. The A-10s successfully located and completely neutralized 7 out of 8 Russian drone launchers inside the Russian federation, severely crippling the adversary's localized tactical drone launch capabilities.
• Force Protection: v93 F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft, assisted by SAM batteries at Rovaniemi AB, successfully destroyed Russian Tu-22 bombers enroute to Rovaniemi. The successful engagement ensured Rovaniemi only had damage from the OWA drones but the runway remains undamaged and available for use.
• Force Deployment: The v303 Fighter Group is fully integrated with Finnish defense forces, expanding intelligence sharing and establishing persistent air and maritime superiority patrols to deter subsequent waves of aggression.

4. G-2 Assessment & Outlook​

The Russian Federation's actions represent a high-stakes, calculated escalation intended to fracture NATO's northern flank. The rapid operational conversion of Ivalo into a forward operating base for Su-33 and Mi-24 assets indicates Russia intends to hold its ground gains and establish an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble over northern Lapland.

However, because the attack failed to neutralize Rovaniemi AB and suffered a loss of localized drone infrastructure to USAF A-10 strikes, the Russian ground forces stand deeply extended. With Article 5 enacted and full Allied reinforcement underway, immediate operations should prioritize the containment of the Sirkka-Sodankylä; Savukoski line, followed by coordinated joint strikes to isolate and recapture the occupied airfield at Ivalo.

NATO Air Forces will begin to execute ACE operations after their next departure from Rovaniemi AB to help survivability. Logistical support aircraft in the region must priorities airlift operations into ACE and road runways within the region to allow for quick refueling and reloading operations for combat aircraft.

5. Targeting​

The Joint Force Commander Intelligence Directorate (G-2) targeting cell, supporting Operation Odin's Fury, has completed a comprehensive review of identified target sets utilizing standard Joint Targeting methodology (AFDP 3-60) and NATO-integrated interdiction protocols.

Specific line items are categorized into four critical target systems: Early Warning Radars (EWR), Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), Airfields/C2, and Logistics. This systemic approach facilitates a unified kinetic strategy for weaponeering and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE). Mission commanders must reference the specific Target Folder to ensure all sortie execution aligns with the authorized Acceptable Level of Risk (ALR).

Comprehensive tactical data regarding assigned target systems is available via the Target Folder. Geopolitical intelligence and precise coordinates for target sets are contained within the OOF_Target_Folder_22MAY26 file, compatible with Google Earth and DCS Web Planner.

While the top five priority objectives are designated, Mission Commanders retain tactical discretion to engage any system within the repository. Furthermore, this folder will serve as the primary source for upcoming weekly flight night Air Tasking Orders (ATOs).

To initiate an engagement, Flight Leads must utilize the “SELECT TGT” interface, subsequently logging their Squadron and Task Acceptance within the integrated spreadsheet. It remains the responsibility of the Flight Lead to architect the sortie based on all available SIGINT and HUMINT; supplemental intelligence requests should be routed through the G-2 cell. Following kinetic operations, Flight Leads are required to complete a Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) by selecting the “SUBMIT BDA” button. This involves updating the dropdown menus for BDA and Reattack Recommendation (RR) in addition to the standard After Action Report (AAR). The provided tactical document includes additional tabs for Target Analysis—offering guidance on weaponeering and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE)—and Definitions, which serves as a functional manual for reporting protocols.

AUTHENTICATION: G-2 Intelligence Directorate United States Air Force (USAF) Classified // REL TO NATO

fFROM: v303 FG Command
TO: v303 FG Members
SUBJECT: Inclement Weather (server performance)
EFFECTIVE DATES: 14 May 2026 to 18 May 2026 (subject to change)

Due to unexpected weather (server performance) all v303 FG sorties have been grounded. Expect additional details no later than Monday 18 May 2026 on weather (server) forcasts. The ATO-OOF-13426 that was scheduled for 14 May 2026 has been pushed to 21 May 2026. ATO and MSN numbers for 21 May 26 sorties have been updated.

//SIGNED///
SNOOPY
Command Staff, v303rd Fighter Group

FROM: vJFACC
TO: v303 FG
SUBJECT: Air Tasking Order (ATO); ATO-OOF-14126
EFFECTIVE DATES: 0001Z21MAY26

REFERENCES​

v303 FG MANUAL 303-1, v303 FG Policy, Procedures, & Basic Operation Standards

• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS A-10C, DCS A-10C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS C-130J, DCS C-130J Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS F-16C, DCS F-16C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• Operation Odin’s Fury (OOF):
  • In-Flight Guide
  • Special Instructions (SPINS) & Rules of Engagement (ROE)
  • Mission DB/SIPRNET
  • Logistics Tracker
  • Theater Map

SITUATION​

On 10 May 2026, a Russian military incursion into Finnish territory escalated regional tensions. Finnish authorities engaged unauthorized aircraft that entered their airspace and attempted to attack v303rd Fighter Group A-10s. Finland utilized SAM assets to destroy both intruding aircraft. The North Atlantic Council condemned the act as a "calculated" test of collective defense. Consequently, the v303 FG has transitioned from deterrence to reinforced defensive support. NATO leaders reaffirmed their Article 5 commitment, stating Finland’s security is inseparable from the alliance. ISR assets remain on heightened alert to ensure decisive collective response. Moscow rejected the "incursion" narrative, characterizing the event as a localized incident caused by pilots acting on their own accord. Russian officials warned that NATO's "militarization" of the High North creates a permanent crisis environment and risks dangerous miscalculations.

NATO maintains a defensive posture, seeking de-escalation while remaining prepared for further provocations. Both sides are currently engaged in a significant information battle regarding attribution and intent.

Although Russian aircraft penetrated Finnish airspace NATO aircraft will NOT cross into Russian airspace. It is believed that the incursions was intended to force NATO to penetrate Russian airspace and give them an excuse to execute an invasion of Finland.

Pilots should review SPINs/ROE, specifically paragraph 2 (Hostile Determination) to ensure they understand current requirements.

SUPPORT ASSETS​

AWACS

• E-7 / MAGIC / -- / 263.0 / -- / FL320

TANKER

• KC-135 / TEXACO / RAGNAR / 295.4 / 31Y
• KC-135 / ARCO / LAGERTHA / 225.45 / 34X

ISR

• RQ-4 / SKYNET / LOKI / 243.0 / -- / FL600
• RQ-4 / FORTE / THOR / 244.0 / -- / FL600
• RQ-4 / TRITON / SIF / 245.0 / -- / FL600
• RQ-4 / SCORE / FRIGG / 246.0 / -- / FL600
• MQ-9 / COLT / BALDR / 247.0 / -- FL290

WEATHER CONDITIONS​

Forecast: Mission start time is approx. 1800 local, Temperature 7C, Winds at 5 knots from 160, broken at 13,000 ft, 28.68. Flight leads will verify latest with DATIS prior to taxi and relay to flight.

MISSION​

• Thursday, 14 May 2026 // MSN NUMBER [SQDRN]14126 v303 EFG units will conduct TSP operations to reinforce situational awareness, ensure freedom of movement, and project NATO solidarity. Due to the intel of Russian Convoys departing Alakurtti Air Base and the Pyaozersky rail yard the v303 FG’s primary tasks are RECCE flights to Frigg and Baldr AOs. NOTE: FRAGOs have specific munitions that flights will be required to carry on 14 May. Leads are NOTauthorized to adjust without Command approval.
  • v93 FStasked with local area fam flight transitioning to border patrol of:
    • Frigg AO (N66° 59.7696' E028° 49.6875' / N66° 43.4827' E029° 3.1183' /
    • N66° 43.0920' E029° 30.6390' / N66° 59.4154' E029° 18.5266' )
      • North (Route 82) Border Checkpoint at N66° 59.4154' E029° 18.5266' E
      • South Border Checkpoint at N66° 45.1267' E029° 11.5898' E
  • v303 FStasked with local area fam flight transitioning to border patrol of:
    • Baldr AO (35W PP 30031 09715/ 36W UT 62382 89941/ 36W UT 80044 90019 / 36 W UT 80044 90019)
      • Boarder Checkpoint at 36W UU 67720 00525
  • v757 AS tasked with to logistical support to Rovaniemi and other FOBs/airfields in Finland.
• See Attachment 1 for FRAGO.
• See Attachment 2 for Theater/Threat Map.

///SIGNED///
SNOOPY
Command Staff, v303rd Fighter Group

ATTACHMENT 1 / FRAGO​

MSN NUMBER: 93FS14126
TASKUNIT/v93 FS/ICAO:EFRO//
MSNDAT/-/-/RECCE/DEPLOC: EFRO/ARRLOC: EFRO//
MSNACFT/-/ACTYP:F16C/2AIM9X_2AIM120C_1AGM88_4GBU39_ANASQ213_ANAAQ33_ALC184L//
TGTLOC/-/NET:-/NLT:-/TGT:-//
CONTROL/PFREQ: VALHALLA 303.025/SFREQ:-/NAME: FRIGG//

MSN NUMBER: 303FS14126
TASKUNIT/v303 FS/ICAO: EFRO//
MSNDAT/-/-/RECCE/DEPLOC: EFRO /ARRLOC: EFRO//
MSNACFT/-/ ACTYP:A10C/HEI_2AIM9M_AGM65D_AGM65L_2GBU54_2GBU12__ANAAQ28_ALC184L//
TGTLOC/-/NET:-/NLT:-/TGT:-//
CONTROL/PFREQ: VALHALLA 303.025/SFREQ:-/NAME: BALDR//

MSN NUMBER: 757AS14126
TASKUNIT/v757 AS/ICAO: EFRO //
MSNDAT/LOGISTICS/-/ DEPLOC:-/ARRLOC:-//
MSNACFT/-/ACTYP:C130J/-//
TGTLOC/-/NET:-/NLT:-/ //
CONTROL/PFREQ: VALHALLA 303.025/SFREQ:-/NAME:-//

High priority for munition deliveries at Hosio (35W MP 40938 08940), Voujarvi (35W MQ 80000 39169) and Kemi Tornio Airport (35W LN 89344 97684).

THEATER MAP

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 12826​

TO: Combat Command / G2 Intelligence Cell
FROM: Intel Officer, USAF
SUBJECT: Russian Ground Force Movements - BALDR and FRIGG Areas of Operation (AO)

1. Executive Summary​

Current tactical imagery confirms coordinated Russian ground force movements toward the Finnish border from two primary staging locations: Pyaozersky and Alakurtti. These movements involve significant convoys transitioning from rail-head debarkation and field exercises into active transit toward established border checkpoints.

---

2. Situation Narrative by Sector​

Sector Alpha: BALDR AO (Pyaozersky Region)​

• Origin: A large Russian convoy has been identified egressing the Pyaozersky rail yard (MGRS: 36W VT 13192 95089).
• Force Disposition: Intelligence indicates these ground forces were recently introduced into the region via rail transport, suggesting a deliberate buildup of regional combat power.
• Intended Objective: The convoy is currently utilizing Route A136, tracking westward toward the border checkpoint located at MGRS: 36W UU 67771 00534.

Sector Bravo: FRIGG AO (Alakurtti Region)​

• Origin: Parallel movement is observed further north, with a large convoy departing Alakurtti Air Base.
• Force Disposition: Unlike the rail-mobile forces in BALDR, these elements were previously engaged in local field exercises, indicating high readiness levels.
• Intended Objective: This element is transiting along Route 82, with an estimated destination of the border checkpoint at MGRS: 35W NQ 88383 26372.

---

3. Intelligence Assessment​

The movement of rail-deployed reinforcements and exercise-ready units suggests a synchronized operational maneuver rather than routine logistics. The convergence on two separate border checkpoints indicates an effort to strain border security infrastructure or establish a multi-axis presence along the frontier.

4. Recommended Action Items​

• ISR Requirements: Task high-altitude assets for continuous persistence over Routes A136 and 82 to monitor convoy composition (e.g., armor vs. motorized infantry).
• Alert Status: Notify regional partners of the projected arrival times at Finnish border checkpoints.
• BDA/Targeting: v93 and v303 FSs tasked with providing a highly visible presence.
• ROE: Return fire only unless Russian Ground forces try to overrun the checkpoints, the checkpoints are fired at, or Russian AF assets cross into Finland.

FROM: vJFACC
TO: v303 FG
SUBJECT: Air Tasking Order (ATO); ATO-OOF-12726
EFFECTIVE DATES: 0001Z07MAY26

REFERENCES​

• v303 FG MANUAL 303-1, v303 FG Policy, Procedures, & Basic Operation Standards
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS A-10C, DCS A-10C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS C-130J, DCS C-130J Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS F-16C, DCS F-16C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• Operation Odin’s Fury (OOF), In-Flight Guide
• OOF, Special Instructions (SPINS) & Rules of Engagement (ROE)
• OOF, Mission DB/SIPRNET
• OOF, Theater Map

SITUATION​

Following the 5 May arrival of the v303 EFG at Rovaniemi AB, NATO has activated a Theater Security Package (TSP) supporting OPERATION ODIN’S FURY (OOF). This action responds to "persistent instability" and a rapid Russian ground force buildup along the border of Russia and Finland. While diplomatic channels remain open, increased electronic interference and unmanned aerial reconnaissance have been detected. All operations remain defensive, deliberate, and transparent to reassure allied nations during this period of heightened uncertainty.

DO NOT cross into Russian airspace. It is imperative that NATO assets do not give Russian authorities an excuse to escalate an already tense situation.

SUPPORT ASSETS​

AWACS

• E-7 / MAGIC / -- / 263.0 / -- / FL320

TANKER

• KC-135 / TEXACO / RAGNAR / 295.4 / 31Y
• KC-135 / ARCO / LAGERTHA / 225.45 / 34X

ISR

• RQ-4 / SKYNET / LOKI / 243.0 / -- / FL600
• RQ-4 / FORTE / THOR / 244.0 / -- / FL600
• RQ-4 / TRITON / SIF / 245.0 / -- / FL600
• RQ-4 / SCORE / FRIGG / 246.0 / -- / FL600
• MQ-9 / COLT / BALDR / 247.0 / -- FL290

WEATHER CONDITIONS​

Forecast: Mission start time is approx. 0300 local, Temperature 4C, Winds at 29 knots from 282, scattered at 9,600 ft, 28.43. Flight leads will verify latest with DATIS prior to taxi and relay to flight.

MISSION​

• Thursday, 7 May 2026 // MSN NUMBER [SQDRN]12726v303 EFG units will conduct Theater Security Package (TSP) operations to reinforce situational awareness, ensure freedom of movement, and project NATO solidarity.
  
  • v93 FS tasked with local area fam flight transitioning to border patrol of:
    
    • Thor AO (N68°34.867' E028°14.631'/ N68°21.046' E028°28.953'/ 35 W NR 81050 83284 / N68°34.574' E028°44.354')
      
      • Border Crossing at N68°28.776' E028°26.636'
    • Lady Sif AO (N67°47.746' E029°36.811' / N67°33.827' E029°49.856' / N67°33.617' E030°18.031' / N67°47.224' E030°05.492')
      
      • Border Crossing at N67°42.928' E029°54.451'
  • v303 FS tasked with local area fam flight transitioning to boarder patrol of:
    
    • Frigg AO (35W NQ 797 321 / 35W NQ 907 023 / 35W PQ 107 022 / 35W PQ 006 323)
      
      • Border Checkpoints at 35W NQ 882 263 & 35W NQ 966 054
    • Baldr AO (35W PP 297 100 / 36W UT 626 899 / 36W UT 800 901 / 36W UU 799 099)
      
      • Border Checkpoint at 36W UU 677 005
  • v757 AS tasked with local area fam flight from Kallax transitioning to logistical support (smart munition kits) to Rovaniemi and Ivalo airfields.

FROM: vJFACC
TO: v303 FG
SUBJECT: Air Tasking Order (ATO); ATO-OOF-12526
EFFECTIVE DATES: 0001Z05MAY26

REFERENCES

• v303 FG MANUAL 303-1, v303 FG Policy, Procedures, & Basic Operation Standards
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS A-10C, DCS A-10C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS C-130J, DCS C-130J Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS F-16C, DCS F-16C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• Operation Odin’s Fury (OOF), In-Flight Guide
• OOF, Special Instructions (SPINS) & Rules of Engagement (ROE)
• OOF details, Mission DB/SIPRNET
• OOF Theater Map, Mission Planning

SITUATION​

The v303 FG deployment assets will depart Bodo AB, Norway and fly to Rovaniemi AB, Finland to prepare for taskings in support of the NATO Theater Security Package in support of Operation Odin’s Fury.

SUPPORT ASSETS​

Reference Operation Odin’s Fury In-Flight Guide. No tanker support is available as all are tasked with supporting additional air assets arrival into theater.

WEATHER CONDITIONS​

Forecast: Mission start time is approx. 1900 local, Temperature 4C, Winds at 29 knots from 260, scattered at 8,270 ft, light rain, 28.43. Flight leads will verify latest with DATIS prior to taxi and relay to flight.

MISSION​

• Tuesday, 5 May 2026 // MSN NUMBER [SQDRN]12726v303 FG units execute the last leg of their flight into theater. Aircraft have been refueled and configured for the flight. Flights will not change the configuration. Additionally flight plans for all aircraft have been preconfigured and will not be changed.
  
  • Flight Plan:
    
    • Bono (initial position)
    • VEKUB
    • VAGAS
    • TENMO
    • EFRO.03
• Verify with Rovaniemi DATIS prior to arrival but expect Runway 03 to be active. Once on the ground and clear of the runway reference the OOF IFG and park at the Squadrons respective ramp with noses pointed away from the runway.

PRIVATE, v303 FG ONLY​

FROM: Virtual United States European Command (vUSEUCOM)
TO: v303 FG Fighter Group (FG)
SUBJECT: Operation Odin’s Fury Special Instructions (SPINS), Rules of Engagement (ROE)
DATE: 24 April 2026

1 GENERAL

1.1 Higher Authority is defined as SECDEF, JFC, JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, USN Air Warfare Commander, USN Surface Warfare Commander, Command Staff/v303 FG, or designated Mission Commander when delegated.
1.2 All aircrew will execute their assigned mission within the scope and detail of this document, over-arching Air Force and Joint Publications, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and local operating rules and procedures, where appropriate.
1.3 NATO aircraft WILL remain OUT of Russian airspace at all times. The Theater Security Package (TSP) has been activated to deter perceived Russian aggression not kinetically deter the perceived aggression. Only vUSEUCOM command or the on-site TSP Commander (v303 FG Group Command Staff) can authorize incursions into Russian airspace.

2 HOSTILE DETERMINATION:
2.1 Inherent Right of Self-defense: All Coalition Forces have the inherent right of self-defense regarding Hostile Acts and Intent to either themselves or third-party nations.
2.2 HOSTILE INTENT is defined as the threat of imminent use of force by forces against the United States, US National interests, US Forces, their property, commercial interests and assets, and other foreign nationals and their property and assets.
2.3 HOSTILE ACT is an attack or use of force by military or paramilitary against the United States and their allies.
2.4 C2 “HOSTILE” declaration is valid (Voice, Data)
2.5 Positive Identification (PID) is required on all unknown contacts (BOGEYs). Report aircraft type and markings to C2 for status and classification. Armed military aircraft of any class may be declared HOSTILE once positively identified (PID) as BANDIT. This does not necessarily authorize weapons engagement authority.
2.6 PID is required on all ground contacts. Reference the OOF In-Flight Guide for Russian air and ground assets. As intel identifies additional red assets they will be included in weekly Air Tasking Orders (ATO).
2.7 PID may be attained by visual or electronics means.
2.8 Point of Origin (POO) is restricted to C2 use only.

3 AIRCRAFT ENGAGEMENT AUTHORITY
3.1 INVESTIGATE command will be used to direct flights to BOGEYs or unknown ground contacts. Does not imply clearance for weapons employment.
3.2 TARGET command authorizes weapons employment once PID HOSTILE criteria are met.
3.3 SMACK command authorizes weapons employment without regard to PID or CDE.
3.4 Show of Presence: A low flyby of military aircraft intended to deter enemy forces from engagement by making yourself known to the enemy.
3.5 Show of Force: An intimidation tactic using afterburners, drop tanks, or other warning shots to announce that US Forces will engage if enemy aggressive actions are not stopped.

4 ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF RISK (ALR)
4.1 Aircrew will adhere to the following ALR matrix for all engagements.
4.2 ALR will be briefed to all aircrew prior to step.

5 COLLATERAL DAMAGE ESTIMATES (CDE). CDE Definition Tactics 1

6 MUNITIONS:
6.1 Unguided munitions are not authorized within 5 nm of friendly military units or withing 5 nm of civilian assets unless a FAC(A) or JTAC is on station or directed by mission commander (MSC).
6.2 Strikes within 1nm of friendly forces require JTAC/FAC(A) coordination and approval.
6.3 CBU munitions are not authorized without v303 FG Command Staff approval.
6.4 Use of depleted uranium (DU) rounds (i.e. Combat Mix) is not authorized without v303 FG Command Staff approval.

7 RE-ATTACK RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 NO RE-ATTACK: Effects achieved against the target, and the threat will not recuperate during the campaign.
7.2 IMMEDIATE RE-ATTACK: Effects not achieved against the target, and the priority of the target requires additional assets within the current operations cycle.
7.3 DELIBERATE RE-ATTACK: Effects not achieved against the target, and the priority of the target requires additional assets incorporated in a normal planning cycle.
7.4 FUTURE CONSIDERATION: Effects achieved against the target, but the adversary may recuperate the target to a point where re-attack may be required during the campaign. Couple this recommendation to the recuperation time of the targeted element.

8 DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS
8.1 Aircrew will report to C2/HHQ authorities battle damage assessment of targets if known or observed. If assessment cannot be made, report munitions expended and any observed effects.
8.2 The basic damage reportable categories are NO DAMAGE, DAMAGED, DESTROYED, or UNKNOWN.
8.3 Damage assessments and sortie after action reports are to be filed within 24 hours of sortie completion in the Mission DB/SIPRNET Messages section of the forums.
9 AIRSPACE
9.1 Airspace designations and boundaries are the responsibility of the v303 FG intelligence team and may be delegated to MC to fit specific mission profiles. Coordination in the combat-ops-planning channel in the v303 FG FG Discord is highly recommended to maintain deconfliction.
9.2 Border crossing is not authorized unless previously approved by v303 FG Command or MC to fit specific mission profiles.
9.3 Aircraft are to avoid crossing into the sovereign territory of Russia during normal operations.

10 PERSONNEL RECOVERY
10.1 Recovery SAR forces of the 374th Expeditionary Rescue Group are positioned within the theater on a continual 6 hour response status, upgradable to 1hr, or 30 minute status in support of named operations on request. Specific airfield information is not provided due to their continued movement within the AoR.
10.2 Wingman of downed flight members shall note time and position of incident, ejection/parachute(s) observed, and local area situation to include enemy/friendly positions and local threat assessment. A report will be included in the mission after action report in the Mission DB/SIPRNET Messages.
10.3 Downed aircrew are expected to initiate SERE procedures immediately and make all efforts to evade capture and contact friendly forces by any available means.
10.4 Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) rules will maintain in effect for the duration of the operation.

11 DAMAGED AIRCRAFT PROCEDURE
11.1 NORDO aircraft shall fly to the designated recovery waypoint, make 2 turns in holding perpendicular to the airfield, and proceed to land straight in without delay. On rollout, NORDO aircraft shall taxi to, park, and shut down in November (Runway 23 landing) or Panther (Runway 05 landing) Ramps.
11.2 Damaged aircraft that cannot be recovered safely at the airfield shall broadcast on UHF Guard their situation and will be attempt to fly to the nearest friendly airfield with crew ejection as close to the airfield as possible.

12 UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT INTERCEPT PROCEDURES
12.1 Flight Lead will take up position right or left observation and will challenge via Guard 243.0 and rock their wings. Wingman will take up low trail position behind the BOGEY in firing position.
12.2 The second element will intercept additional BOGEYs using the same procedure. If no other BOGEY, second element will position in 1 mile trail behind lead element.
12.3 Flight will report any threatening posture (Bomb Bay doors open, Equipped Anti-ship missiles et) to C2.
12.4 Engagement authority remains with HHQ via C2 message, voice or digital.
12.5 If BOGEY encroaches within 10 NM of friendlies, Lead will extend forward and safely cross in front of intruder aircraft (BUMP) and dispense warning flares.
12.6 Watch for rocking wings by intruder to indicate willingness to follow the intercepting aircraft.

13 COMMUNICATIONS
13.1 Communication channels in theater will have inter flight communications, at a minimum, secured at all times unless situation dictates clear comms.
13.2 Codewords will be developed for each mission as necessary to maintain security over clear channels.
13.3 All aircraft will monitor UFH guard at all times.

PRIVATE, v303 FG ONLY​

PRIVATE, v303 FG ONLY​

Command, Virtual 303rd Fighter Group
Ramstein AB, Germany
v303FG Deployment Order 26-001
Operation ODIN’S FURY
Date: 23 Apr 2026​

REFERENCES

• v303 FG MANUAL 303-1, v303 FG Policy, Procedures, & Basic Operation Standards
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS A-10C, DCS A-10C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS F-16C, DCS F-16C Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• v303 FG MANUAL 11-2 DCS C-130J, DCS C-130J Operating Procedures, Standards, and Training Program
• Operation ODIN’S FURY, JIPOE Briefing
• Operation ODIN’S FURY, Mission DB/SIPRNET Messages

NARRATIVE

This v303FG Deployment Order (DEPORD) implements the virtual United States European Command (vUSEUCOM) and virtual North Atlantic Treaty Organization (vNATO) Theater Security Package (TSP) deployment tasking to support Operation ODIN’S FURY (OOF) by outlining priorities, objectives, and tasks within the High North area of responsibility.

This order is directive in nature. All members of the v303 FG must read it in its entirety. Members of the v303 FG Command Staff are expected to hold members of the v303 FG to this document and those referenced above.

Unless superseded by future order(s) the v303 FG will be in theater from 1 May 2026 to 31 July 2026.

SITUATION

• The Russian Federation continues to mass forces in the Leningrad Military District. NATO Intelligence (J2) confirms that Moscow’s strategic narrative is built on the assumption of a fragmented Alliance. The Kremlin believes that U.S. domestic focus on North American territorial expansion (Greenland/Canada) has nullified the American commitment to European defense.
• NATO Forces in the region are charged with Deterrence by Denial so technical integrated and visible convince the Russian General Staff that any violation of Finnish sovereignty will result in immediate, unacceptable losses. NATO Forces are not deployed to start a war. The TSP has been activated to prove that the "fracture" in NATO is a myth and the alliance stands firm on it’s foundational principles. Finnish Defense Forces (FDF) are at High Readiness with Sweden and Norway posturing to assist Finland and incoming TSP assets. NATO allies remain unified despite public diplomatic friction.
• As part of the TSP the v303 FG shall deter Russian aggression and preserve the territorial integrity of Finland through the immediate deployment of a high-lethality Theater Security Package (TSP).

MISSION

• The v303 FG will provide support and actions as necessary to establish and maintain security of the region, protect civilian non-combatants, and defend NATO territory if required. v303 FG will use all resources necessary to achieve and maintain these objectives.
  
  • PHASE I – SIGNAL. High-visibility arrival in theater to project power in the region.
  • PHASE II – PRESENCE. Continuous 24/7 Combat Air Patrols (CAP) within 15nm of the FIR (Flight Information Region) boundary.
  • PHASE III – INTEGRATION. Integrated Live-Fire exercises with Finnish Ground Forces to demonstrate CAS (Close Air Support) proficiency and provide logistical support moving munitions, equipment, and personnel to key locations along the Finnish/Russian boarder.

EXECUTION

• JOINT FORCES AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFACC) INTENT
  
  • The JFACC’s intent is to rapidly project airpower into the Finnish Theater of Operations (FTO) to signal NATO’s unwavering commitment to Article 5. We will exploit the enemy’s miscalculation by establishing a dominant "Wall of Lead and Steel" before their hybrid operations escalate to kinetic invasion.
  • The v303 FG executes a rapid deployment to Rovaniemi Air Base (EFRO) Finland, NLT 5 MAY 2026, to conduct Shor of Force opeations, Combat Air Patrol (CAP), Armed Reconnaissance (AR), and Tactical Airlift operations in support of Operation ODIN’S FURY.
• ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK (ALR). Initial ALR is established as MEDIUM for all missions unless specifically directed otherwise. It is expected that the ALR will adjust as conditions dictate.
• COLLATERAL DAMAGE GUIDANCE – Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) level will be 3 upon initial deployment into the theater. CDE 3 indicates MAY NOT ENGAGE OR EMPLOY WEAPONS WITHOUT v303 FG COMMAND APPROAVAL. If Russian assets cross into Finish territory and do not return to Russian territory when warned or they fire on NATO assets; said assets are authorized to act in self-defense.
• TST GUIDANCE. Time Sensitive Targets, by their very nature, will be top priority for assigned forces. Maximum effort shall be given to prosecute TST’s as soon as reasonably possible. Regarding TST’s, ALR shall be MEDIUM and the allowable CDE will be 3 unless specifically directed otherwise.

///SIGNED///
SNOOPY
Command Staff , v303rd Fighter Group

PRIVATE, v303 FG ONLY​

PRIVATE, V303 FG ONLY
ISSUING HEADQUARTERS: vNATO SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS (SHAPE)
EFFECTIVE DATE/TIME: 1 MAY 2026, 0001Z

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​

OPERATION ORDER (OPORD): ODIN’S FURY​

1. SITUATION

The Russian Federation continues to mass forces in the Leningrad Military District. NATO Intelligence (J2) confirms that Moscow’s strategic narrative is built on the assumption of a fragmented Alliance. The Kremlin believes that U.S. domestic focus on North American territorial expansion (Greenland/Canada) has nullified the American commitment to European defense.

2. MISSION

On Order, the v303 Fighter Group deploys to Finland to conduct Theater Security Operations. The initial and primary goal is to act as a decisive deterrence against Russian aggression or mobilization into Finnish territory by demonstrating an integrated, high-readiness NATO air combat capability.

3. EXECUTION

a. Commander’s Intent: My primary objective is Deterrence by Denial. We will project a force so technically integrated and visible that the Russian General Staff must conclude that any violation of Finnish sovereignty will result in immediate, unacceptable losses. We are not here to start a war; we are here to prove that the "fracture" in NATO is a myth. Success is defined as the Russian 44th Army Corps remaining on their side of the border.

b. Concept of Operations (CONOPS): The operation will proceed in three phases:

• Phase I (Signal): High-visibility arrival (scheduled to arrive in theater 3 May 2026)
• Phase II (Presence): Continuous 24/7 Combat Air Patrols (CAP) within 15nm of the FIR (Flight Information Region) boundary.
• Phase III (Integration): Integrated Live-Fire exercises with Finnish Ground Forces to demonstrate CAS (Close Air Support) proficiency.

c. Tasks to Subordinate Units:

• 93rd FS "Makos" (F-16C): Lead the Deterrence Air Shield. Maintain constant "Active Scramble" status. Conduct high-altitude sweeps to paint Russian A-50 Mainstay and interceptor radar, signaling NATO’s "Eyes-On" posture.
• 303rd FS "KC Hawgs" (A-10C): Primary Anti-Armor Deterrent. Conduct low-level familiarization flights over key Finnish "Choke Point" terrain. Presence is intended to signal to Russian armored columns that their avenues of approach are pre-targeted.
• 757th AS "Blue Tigers" (C-130J-30): Sustain the Logistical Backbone. Execute high-tempo "Hub and Spoke" resupply missions, demonstrating the Alliance’s ability to sustain a long-term combat footprint in the Arctic.

d. Coordinating Instructions:

• Strategic Communication (STRATCOM): All units will maintain transponders "ON" during Phase I to ensure visibility on global flight-tracking software, amplifying the deterrence message to the Russian public and leadership.
• Aggressive Posture: Pilots are authorized to perform "Head-On" intercepts if Russian aircraft violate Finnish airspace, per NATO SROE.
• Coordination Card.

4. SUSTAINMENT

• Theater Opening: v303 FG is designated as the Lead Air Element for the Finland TSP (Theater Security Package).
• Host Nation Support: Finnish Defense Forces provide all Class I (Subsistence) and Class III (Fuel) requirements.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Unity of Command: Despite diplomatic rhetoric, all v303 assets remain under the operational control (OPCON) of vSACEUR.

Snoopy
SNOOPY
Command Staff , v303rd Fighter Group